WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

SIGNAL ATLAS

CALENDAR WEEK / 2026

44

Power failures and damaged fiber explain several disruptions, while other traffic drops remain unresolved

26 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER 2026



GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE / POINTS ARE NOT IMPACT BOUNDARIES

INDEPENDENT PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

Evidence observed: 02 Nov 2026, 13:00 UTC

Agent9 analysis of public sources. No government affiliation implied.

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

01 / EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

Power failures and damaged fiber explain several disruptions, while other traffic drops remain unresolved

Digicel Haiti's long interruption, three power-related cases and the limits of the remaining network signals

4	8	12	17
Outage records	Researched stories	Anomaly records	Cited sources

Archived measurements for October 26 through November 1 show four reported outages alongside overlapping and unexplained traffic anomalies. Reporting connects Digicel Haiti's interruption to damaged fiber links and documents electricity failures in Guyana, Bangladesh and northern Peru. Those accounts do not establish identical electricity and internet recovery times. Guyana has a second measurement source supporting connectivity loss, while Mexican customer reports add context to simultaneous provider anomalies. Several other signals remain unexplained, and VK's open record does not establish continuous loss of service.

01 / Haiti's longest reported interruption has a documented repair obstacle

Radar records a 22-hour-15-minute Digicel Haiti disruption. Reporting quotes the operator describing damaged international fiber links and difficulty reaching repair sites. Its account supports a physical infrastructure explanation, without independently establishing responsibility for the damage. [1] [5] [6]

02 / Electricity and internet recovery follow different clocks

Reports document power failures in Guyana, Bangladesh and northern Peru, but their times do not exactly match Radar's traffic windows. Grid reconnection, customer electricity restoration and internet recovery should remain separate milestones. [1] [3] [8] [12]

03 / Simultaneous Mexican signals have no established shared cause

Izzi and Totalplay anomalies begin together in the archive. Mexican reporting also describes customer connection problems, but neither matching timestamps nor overlapping complaints establish a common technical failure. [1] [14]

Counts describe source records, not affected people or a complete census of disruptions. Related outage and anomaly records can describe the same incident.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 01 / Guyana country-level measurements; reported electricity disruption across Demerara and Berbice

Guyana’s connectivity loss coincided with a transmission-line trip

OBSERVED RECORD

Cloudflare’s archived outage record covers three and a half hours on October 30. Its separate automated anomaly covers a shorter, overlapping two-hour period. The archived IODA check also detected lost connectivity through active probing, providing a second monitor’s evidence of disruption. Neither country-level signal establishes that every community or internet provider lost service. [1] [2]

RESEARCH FINDING

In its October 30 statement, reproduced by Guyana Standard, Guyana Power and Light said the line between Grove and Sophia tripped at approximately “08:12 hrs.” The utility reported an earth fault and said subsequent inspections found no physical explanation. It suspected deliberate interference, but the statement supplied no independently verified evidence establishing sabotage or identifying an actor. [3]

RESEARCH FINDING

La Caribeña News preserved a ministry-published utility notice reported at “9.51am Guyana time” on October 30. It listed Georgetown, East Coast and East Bank Demerara, West Demerara and Berbice, with restoration time unknown. That notice time, the utility’s earlier trip time and Radar’s traffic window describe different milestones and should not be substituted for one another. [4] [3] [1]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT


The evidence supports a connectivity disruption associated with a documented electricity failure. Radar’s nationwide classification is broader than the geographic detail in the utility reporting, which concentrates on Demerara and Berbice. The remaining questions are which internet networks lost service, when electricity returned across affected areas, and whether a completed investigation explains the line trip. [1] [2] [3] [4]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC

Guyana’s connectivity loss coincided with a transmission-line trip



Recorded windows are not subscriber outage durations. An open end does not establish continuity.

Source observation windows in UTC. Different source windows remain separate; a missing end is shown as a point, not an assumed continuing outage.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / Guyana country-level measurements; reported electricity disruption across Demerara and Berbice

Which internet providers and communities were affected, and did their recovery times differ?

Radar classifies outage:1741 as NATIONWIDE and POWER_OUTAGE. These are provider classifications, not verified impact boundaries or findings about the initiating fault.

The archived IODA result establishes active-probing disruption somewhere within Radar's window; it supplies no exact independent start or end, so no IODA source window is invented.

GPL's October 30 statement gives approximately '08:12 hrs' without an explicit timezone in the consulted reproduction. No sourceWindows entry is assigned to it.

The ministry notice was reported at '30 October 2026, 9.51am Guyana time'; this is a notice timestamp, not a verified outage onset. It gave no restoration time.

The archived Radar outage begins at 12:00 UTC, while its anomaly begins at 12:30 UTC and ends an hour earlier. Both windows are retained.

GPL's allegation of deliberate interference remains unverified. Reproductions of its statement constitute one explanation lineage.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 02 / Digicel Haiti network; customer impact not independently quantified

Damaged links and difficult repair access prolonged Digicel Haiti's interruption

OBSERVED RECORD

Radar's archived Digicel Haiti outage spans 22 hours and 15 minutes across October 27 and 28. An automated anomaly has exactly the same endpoints, so these are two records of one episode. A separate 90-minute anomaly began on October 25 and extended into the observation week; its relationship to the longer interruption is unestablished. [1]

RESEARCH FINDING

Kominotek's October 28 report quotes chief executive Jean-Philippe Brun describing two damaged international fiber links along Route Nationale 1. According to that account, technicians had located the damage on October 27, but insecurity impeded access. The following day, teams believed they could reach the sites after evaluating routes; no firm restoration estimate was available before inspection. [5]

RESEARCH FINDING

An October 30 RL News Haiti report relayed Digicel's account that a link was damaged on October 27 "vers 13 h" and service returned Wednesday. The operator attributed that damage to tree cutting for barricades and said another link had already been cut the previous week. It acknowledged difficulties communicating, working and accessing financial services. [6]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT


The reporting supports damaged fiber and constrained repair access as the operator's explanation for the long interruption. It does not independently establish who damaged the links or connect the earlier anomaly to the same incident. The key operational gap is whether Wednesday's restoration covered every affected service, including financial transactions, or whether some customers recovered later. [1] [5] [6]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC

Damaged links and difficult repair access prolonged Digicel Haiti's interruption



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WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / Digicel Haiti network; customer impact not independently quantified

Did all affected Digicel services recover together, and what explains the October 25 to 26 anomaly?

The network is AS27653. Haiti is its registration-country reference, not a measured nationwide impact boundary.

Radar describes a complete network outage and classifies the cause as CABLE_CUT; those descriptions remain attributed to Radar.

The October 30 report gives damage timing as October 27 'vers 13 h' without an explicit timezone and restoration only as Wednesday. Neither becomes a precise source window.

The two damaged links need not have been damaged simultaneously: the October 30 account says one had already been cut the previous week.

The archived independent check was unavailable because the outage record lacked a country reference. This does not mean independent network-level investigation is impossible.

The cause and repair accounts originate with Digicel. Multiple articles relaying those statements are not independent confirmation of responsibility.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 03 / Bangladesh traffic signal; electricity reporting centered on eastern Dhaka and parts of Chattogram

Bangladesh’s grid disruption had several reported recovery milestones

OBSERVED RECORD

Radar’s reported outage and automated Bangladesh anomaly share a five-and-a-half-hour window on October 27. Radar classifies the event as regional and power-related, naming eastern Dhaka and parts of Chattogram. The archived IODA check found no matching alert. That absence leaves the internet disruption without a second measurement confirmation here, but does not disprove a regional event. [1] [2]

RESEARCH FINDING

Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha reported that the electricity board chairman attributed the interruption to a trip on the Meghnaghat-Haripur line. Its account described about an hour of disruption affecting the Secretariat, surrounding areas and parts of Chattogram. This provides a named official’s explanation of the electricity failure, rather than independent proof of the duration of internet loss. [7]

RESEARCH FINDING

Dhaka Stream’s October 27 restoration report gives an electricity interruption beginning at “12:43pm” and grid restoration completed at “2:30pm.” It also says generators were returning in phases and distribution loads were rising gradually. Separately, bdnews24 described a six-hour outage, while The Business Standard quoted an electricity official expecting conditions to improve around “10pm.” [8] [9] [10]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT


These accounts should remain separate: restoring transmission lines does not establish that generation, household electricity and internet access recovered simultaneously. The reporting supports a grid disturbance but leaves the detailed failure mechanism under investigation. Which restoration milestone best explains Radar’s longer traffic reduction, and which districts remained affected after grid reconnection, are still unresolved. [1] [8] [9] [10]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC

Bangladesh's grid disruption had several reported recovery milestones



Recorded windows are not subscriber outage durations. An open end does not establish continuity.

Source observation windows in UTC. Different source windows remain separate; a missing end is shown as a point, not an assumed continuing outage.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / Bangladesh traffic signal; electricity reporting centered on eastern Dhaka and parts of Chattogram

Which affected districts and internet providers explain the full five-and-a-half-hour traffic window?

The reported '12:43pm' onset and '2:30pm' grid restoration on October 27 lack explicit timezones in the consulted Dhaka Stream text. They are preserved as written and omitted from sourceWindows.

BSS describes about an hour of interruption; bdnews24 describes a six-hour outage. These reports may describe different places or restoration stages, which the consulted evidence does not reconcile.

The Business Standard's October 27 report quotes expected improvement around '10pm'. This was a forecast, not a confirmed restoration endpoint, and its timezone is not explicit.

A consulted secondary timeline, Your Power Setup, additionally reports conflicting '13:40' and '14:30 local' transmission restoration times. The earlier time was not verified in an original statement and is not adopted.

Radar's power-outage classification and official descriptions of a line trip do not establish the underlying technical cause.

The IODA absence applies to the archived country-level alert check, not every possible sensor or affected network.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 04 / Radar references Piura and Lambayeque; electricity reporting covers a wider northern area

Northern Peru’s power failure overlaps a regional internet disruption

OBSERVED RECORD

Radar’s archived November 1 record describes a regional internet disruption lasting two hours and 45 minutes, with Piura and Lambayeque as geographic references. Its narrative places the Piura traffic decline around 14:45 local time. No affected internet provider is named, and the archived IODA country check contains no matching alert. [1] [2]

RESEARCH FINDING

Infobae’s November 1 report relays Enosa’s account of a national interconnected electricity-system event that disconnected the Trujillo Norte-REP and Guadalupe transmission lines. It gives the power interruption’s start as “15:03 horas,” covering localities across northern Peru. Enosa was coordinating with the system operator and had not supplied a complete restoration deadline or detailed initiating cause. [12]


ANALYST ASSESSMENT

The reported electricity interruption is relevant context for Radar’s power classification, but its stated onset differs from Radar’s local-time narrative. The electricity footprint also extends beyond the regions in the internet record. Establishing the relationship requires a reconciled timeline and provider-level evidence; the consulted reporting does not justify attributing the failure to weather or treating all northern residents as disconnected. [1] [12]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC



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WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / Radar references Piura and Lambayeque; electricity reporting covers a wider northern area

Why does Radar describe a decline around 14:45 local while electricity reporting gives '15:03 horas'?

Infobae's November 1 power-onset time has no explicit timezone in the consulted text, so it is not converted into a sourceWindows entry.

Radar supplies an explicit 19:45 UTC start and a 22:30 UTC end; these are traffic-record endpoints, not verified electricity restoration times.

Which networks and localities in Piura and Lambayeque lost connectivity?

The consulted Correo November 1 archive separately identifies disconnection of the L-5008 Nueva Chimbote-Trujillo line and gives '3:03 p. m.' as the power onset. The relationship between that line and Enosa's named downstream disconnections remains unresolved.

Enosa's explanation was accessed through reporting; its government portal could not be retrieved. The source does not attribute the outage to rain.

The lack of an archived IODA country alert does not rule out regional internet loss.

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 05 / Two Mexican provider networks; shared cause unconfirmed

Izzi and Totalplay signals align with customer complaints

OBSERVED RECORD

The archived izzi and Totalplay anomalies begin at the same time on October 28, but end at different times the following day. Izzi's record spans seven hours and Totalplay's two and a half hours. These are provider-network traffic anomalies, with no cause recorded; their Mexican registration references do not establish nationwide service loss. [1]

RESEARCH FINDING

Ejecentral's October 28 reporting describes connection complaints involving both providers and says Totalplay acknowledged problems in certain areas. Much of the geographic detail comes from Downdetector reports, which reflect participating customers rather than a complete service census. The article supplies no confirmed common cause, complete list of affected locations or final restoration time. [14]


ANALYST ASSESSMENT

The matching starts and same-day complaints justify discussing these records together, while leaving their causes unresolved. They do not establish that both providers experienced the same upstream failure. The useful next evidence would be an operator incident account identifying the affected infrastructure and distinguishing access-network problems from difficulties reaching particular online services. [1] [14]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC



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WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / Two Mexican provider networks; shared cause unconfirmed

Did izzi and Totalplay share a failed dependency, or were the interruptions separate?

The archived networks are izzi AS28548 and Totalplay AS17072. Both records carry the provider verification label TP; that label does not establish a cause.

Ejecentral is dated October 28 and displays '20:05' without an explicit timezone. It provides no precise service-loss window, so no corresponding sourceWindows entry is created.

Totalplay's acknowledgment was accessed through reporting, not a directly retrievable incident statement.

Reports drawing on the same Downdetector complaints are one complaint-data lineage, not multiple independent measurements.

No evidence consulted establishes a nationwide outage or a shared Cloudflare failure.

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 06 / VKONTAKTE-SPB-AS; record began before the observation week

VK’s open anomaly leaves the duration of service impact unresolved

OBSERVED RECORD

The VK network anomaly began on October 18 and still has no end timestamp in the archived measurements. That makes it a carryover record, rather than a newly observed outage this week. An open traffic anomaly cannot establish uninterrupted loss of access, and the network’s Russian registration does not define where users experienced problems. [1]

RESEARCH FINDING

As context predating this week, Fontanka reported on October 18 that VK acknowledged a drone attack on its data center in the Leningrad region while saying services remained normally available. The report also noted earlier user access complaints. That tension is relevant to the anomaly’s starting date, but does not establish how the network behaved throughout the following week. [15]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT

The unresolved issue is whether the continuing record reflects persistent traffic displacement, intermittent service degradation or an anomaly that had not been closed. The available material cannot choose among those possibilities. A dated network explanation and service recovery evidence would be needed before assigning the entire open interval to the reported October 18 incident. [1] [15]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC

VK's open anomaly leaves the duration of service impact unresolved



Recorded windows are not subscriber outage durations. An open end does not establish continuity.

Source observation windows in UTC. Different source windows remain separate; a missing end is shown as a point, not an assumed continuing outage.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / VKONTAKTE-SPB-AS; record began before the observation week

What explains the still-open AS47541 record, and when did any customer-facing impact end?

The start predates the observation week by eight days. A null end is not proof of continuous disruption through November 1.

Fontanka's October 18 report links VK's original statement, but that operator page could not be retrieved. The company account is therefore attributed through Fontanka.

The report displays '18 October 2026, 05:37' without an explicit timezone in the consulted article text; it is not used as an event window.

Neither the anomaly nor the cited statement establishes a cyberattack, nationwide internet loss, or responsibility for the reported physical attack.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 07 / CAMNET-AS in Cameroon

Camtel has overlapping published signals, but no verified cause


OBSERVED RECORD

Radar's archived CAMNET-AS anomaly spans 90 minutes on October 29. A separate GeoCables page reports a Camtel signal reduction over an overlapping 80-minute period. The two published windows are close but not identical. GeoCables supplies additional measurement context, while neither record identifies the underlying fault or establishes how many customers lost service. [1] [16]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT

No event-specific Camtel explanation was located in the consulted public sources. GeoCables describes its cause suggestions as heuristic, so they are not adopted as a diagnosis. This remains a cause-unconfirmed lead: which services and locations were affected, and whether the change resulted from an access, routing or other operational problem, still require an operator account. [1] [16]

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC



Recorded windows are not subscriber outage durations. An open end does not establish continuity.

Source observation windows in UTC. Different source windows remain separate; a missing end is shown as a point, not an assumed continuing outage.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / CAMNET-AS in Cameroon

Which Camtel services and locations were affected, and what caused the October 29 change?

The archived network is AS15964. Cameroon is the network-registration reference, not an impact boundary.

GeoCables reports 12:50 to 14:10 UTC, compared with Radar's 12:45 to 14:15 UTC. Both are retained.

GeoCables discusses active probing and BGP visibility, but the independence of its complete measurement lineage was not established here. It is not counted as a verified additional independent lineage.

GeoCables' signal percentages and estimates of provider market share are not converted into affected-person counts.

No technical, political or security cause is established by the consulted material.

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

INCIDENT ANALYSIS / 08 / CANTV, TE-AS and COTAS; separate anomalies grouped for follow-up

Three other network leads remain unexplained

OBSERVED RECORD

The archive contains separate October 26 traffic anomalies for CANTV and Telecom Egypt's TE-AS, lasting two and a half hours and 90 minutes respectively. COTAS has a five-hour-45-minute record on October 29, followed by an October 30 record with identical start and end timestamps. That last record supplies no usable outage duration and must not be described as a zero-minute outage. [1]

ANALYST ASSESSMENT


Targeted public-source searches did not locate an event-specific operator explanation or original report securely matching these windows. They therefore remain separate, cause-unconfirmed leads grouped for follow-up. The unanswered questions are whether customers lost connectivity, where any impact occurred, and whether COTAS's later timestamp represents another episode or a recording artifact. [1]

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE WINDOWS / UTC

Three other network leads remain unexplained



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Source observation windows in UTC. Different source windows remain separate; a missing end is shown as a point, not an assumed continuing outage.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED / CANTV, TE-AS and COTAS; separate anomalies grouped for follow-up

What caused the CANTV AS8048 anomaly, and which customers or locations experienced disruption?

What caused the TE-AS AS8452 anomaly, and was its full recorded interval associated with customer service loss?

Does the COTAS AS25620 record at 04:00 UTC on October 30 represent a separate incident or a recording artifact?

A consulted Telecom Egypt complaint-summary page concerns reports around '12:02AM EEST' on October 26, outside the archived evening anomaly. It is not treated as confirmation of this event.

The countries attached to these networks are registration references: Venezuela, Egypt and Bolivia. They do not prove national impact.

All four records carry Radar's VERIFIED label, but none contains a cause. Verification labels are not independent explanations.

No shared cause is asserted across these networks, and no unrelated same-country reporting is used to explain them.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

EVIDENCE REGISTER

Traceable by design

Every archived event ID is retained below. Timestamps belong to their source records; source windows may differ. No end date means no end was supplied, not proof of continuing loss of access.

Scope / record type	Source event ID	Start / UTC	End / UTC
VKONTAKTE-SPB-AS anomaly	anomaly:a29cfee2-c589-4e53-ac50-1640ca180694	2026-10-18 00:00:00	Not reported
Digicel Haiti anomaly	anomaly:e857f3bc-f203-4c17-b8cf-57aac1d053c0	2026-10-25 22:45:00	2026-10-26 00:15:00
CANTV anomaly	anomaly:d1075e14-02ef-4845-90a2-19939fe128ec	2026-10-26 17:00:00	2026-10-26 19:30:00
TE-AS anomaly	anomaly:714430cf-a694-44f2-8bf0-414d2b31fe3e	2026-10-26 19:30:00	2026-10-26 21:00:00
Bangladesh anomaly	anomaly:1347d0be-8c1f-40cf-b681-4eac5ff8e32e	2026-10-27 06:30:00	2026-10-27 12:00:00
Bangladesh outage	outage:1737	2026-10-27 06:30:00	2026-10-27 12:00:00
Digicel Haiti anomaly	anomaly:506bebf6-8615-4210-916d-4fbde9b9ee1a	2026-10-27 17:15:00	2026-10-28 15:30:00
Digicel Haiti outage	outage:1739	2026-10-27 17:15:00	2026-10-28 15:30:00
izzi telecom (AS28548) anomaly	anomaly:64f6793b-2be9-47a5-af78-ff34ac8ba226	2026-10-28 23:30:00	2026-10-29 06:30:00
TOTAL PLAY TELECOM UNICACIONES AS17072 anomaly	anomaly:89db42f0-93f9-4001-8eae-010cec374999	2026-10-28 23:30:00	2026-10-29 02:00:00

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

Scope / record type	Source event ID	Start / UTC	End / UTC
CAMNET-AS anomaly	anomaly:d2046116-1190-4570-b095-7696f02c6a86	2026-10-29 12:45:00	2026-10-29 14:15:00
COTAS LTDA. anomaly	anomaly:43cf8757-1b53-427b-a807-f1a0d0921890	2026-10-29 17:00:00	2026-10-29 22:45:00
COTAS LTDA. anomaly	anomaly:4c1d6db7-7a95-4d0e-a991-c8a874d28cf9	2026-10-30 04:00:00	2026-10-30 04:00:00
Guyana outage	outage:1741	2026-10-30 12:00:00	2026-10-30 15:30:00
Guyana anomaly	anomaly:df349a53-9243-41e4-a672-8c5f85ad7437	2026-10-30 12:30:00	2026-10-30 14:30:00
Peru outage	outage:1742	2026-11-01 19:45:00	2026-11-01 22:30:00

METHOD AND SCOPE

Reporting window: 2026-10-26T00:00:00.000Z to 2026-11-02T00:00:00.000Z (end excluded). Evidence observed: 2026-11-02T13:00:09.794Z. Entries may begin before the week or continue after it.

Measurements establish observations within the source's coverage. They do not by themselves establish cause, intent, responsible actors, affected population, or geographic impact boundaries. Research and assessment paragraphs retain their stated attribution and uncertainty.

Where independent country-level reachability observations are supplied, they remain distinct from operator-level effects and cause claims. Multiple sensors from one provider are not multiple independent organisations.

UNCLASSIFIED | PUBLIC-SOURCE ANALYSIS

EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

SOURCE PACK / EXTERNAL LINKS

Read the underlying evidence

01 / Cloudflare Radar Outage Center

Cloudflare | Published: date not supplied

Evidence origin for all four outage records and 12 anomalies in the supplied archive. Event details and windows come from that archive; the public page was consulted, but its dynamic historical records were not independently re-extracted. Linked Radar X posts could not be fetched.

https://radar.cloudflare.com/outage-center

02 / IODA internet outage monitoring

Georgia Tech Internet Intelligence Lab | Published: date not supplied

Evidence origin for the supplied archived active-probing confirmation in Guyana and absence of matching country alerts in Bangladesh and Peru. The public application was consulted; exact historical series were not independently re-extracted.

https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/

03 / GPL statement on the October 30 transmission-line trip

Guyana Standard, reproducing Guyana Power and Light | Published: 2026-10-30

GPL's original statement as reproduced: approximate 08:12 trip, Grove-Sophia line, earth fault, inspection findings and unverified suspicion of deliberate interference.

https://www.guyanastandard.com/2026/10/30/gpl-says-sabotage-of-transmission-line-caused-latest-widespread-blackout/

04 / Report preserving GPL’s October 30 ministry notice

La Caribeña News | Published: 2026-10-30

Reported utility-notice timestamp of 9.51am Guyana time, listed affected areas and absent restoration estimate. Page showed an update dated November 1; unrelated political and economic commentary is not adopted.

https://www.lacaribenanews.com/guyana-four-regions-power-outage-royal-business-reception-30-october-2026/

05 / Digicel describes damaged links and repair-access difficulties

Kominotek | Published: 2026-10-28

Reporting of Jean-Philippe Brun's October 27 and 28 communications about two damaged international links on RN1, insecurity delaying access and the lack of an initial restoration estimate.

https://kominotek.com/haiti-digicel-mobilise-ses-equipes-pour-reparer-deux-liaisons-de-fibre-optique-endommagees/

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06 / Digicel’s account of fiber damage and Wednesday restoration

RL News Haiti | Published: 2026-10-30

Operator account of October 27 damage around 13 h, an earlier damaged link, Wednesday restoration and difficulties with communications, work and financial services. Responsibility claims remain attributed.

https://rlnewshaiti.com/haiti-digicel-demande-une-meilleure-protection-de-ses-infrastructures-apres-une-coupure-de-fibre/

07 / Electricity board chairman explains Dhaka and Chattogram interruption

Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha | Published: 2026-10-27

Named official's explanation involving the Meghnaghat-Haripur line, affected locations and an approximately one-hour electricity interruption.

https://www.bssnews.net/news/438901

08 / Grid restoration followed by gradual recovery of supply

Dhaka Stream | Published: 2026-10-27

PGCB statement reported as onset at 12:43pm and grid restoration at 2:30pm, followed by phased generation and distribution recovery. Timezone is not explicit.

https://www.dhakastream.net/bangladesh/national-grid-restored-power-supply-returning-normal-pgcb-200442

09 / Investigation into Bangladesh’s grid collapse

bdnews24.com | Published: 2026-10-27

Reporting of an investigation and a six-hour electricity outage, retained separately from shorter restoration accounts.

https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/xezi0kyd8n

10 / Electricity official describes gradual generation recovery

The Business Standard | Published: 2026-10-27

Named BPDB official's account of generation returning in phases and expected improvement around 10pm, which is a forecast rather than a confirmed endpoint.

https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/energy/grid-failure-meghnaghat-triggers-power-outages-across-dhaka-ctg-sylhet-1584311

11 / Secondary account flags conflicting transmission restoration times

Your Power Setup | Published: date not supplied

Consulted search-indexed text reports 13:40 and 14:30 local restoration accounts. The earlier time was not verified in an original statement and appears only as an unresolved research discrepancy.

https://yourpowersetup.com/outages/dhaka-chattogram-power-outage-october-2026

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EVIDENCE OBSERVED 02 NOV 2026, 13:00 UTC

12 / Enosa reports northern Peru transmission disconnections

Infobae | Published: 2026-11-01

Enosa's reported 15:03 power onset, named transmission lines, northern geographic scope and coordination with COES. No detailed initiating cause or complete restoration deadline was supplied.

https://www.infobae.com/peru/2026/11/01/corte-masivo-de-luz-afecta-desde-trujillo-hasta-tumbes-por-un-evento-en-el-sistema-electrico-interconectado-nacional/

13 / Correo's November 1 archive identifies another transmission line

Correo | Published: 2026-11-01

Archive summary identifies L-5008 Nueva Chimbote-Trujillo and a 3:03 p. m. electricity interruption. Used only to preserve the unresolved infrastructure detail.

https://diariocorreo.pe/archivo/todas/2026-11-01/

14 / Customer complaints and Totalplay acknowledgment on October 28

Ejecentral | Published: 2026-10-28

Reports of connection problems involving Totalplay and izzi, complaint-based geographic information, and a reported Totalplay acknowledgment without a technical cause or final restoration time.

https://www.ejecentral.com.mx/nuestro-eje/caida-de-totalplay-e-izzi-hoy-28-de-octubre-reportan-fallas-de-internet-en-varios-estados

15 / VK acknowledges a data-center attack and says services remain available

Fontanka | Published: 2026-10-18

Pre-week context: VK's quoted statement acknowledging a physical attack while asserting normal service availability, alongside reported user complaints. Does not establish continuous impact.

https://www.fontanka.ru/2026/10/18/76708355/

16 / GeoCables' October 29 Camtel signal

GeoCables | Published: date not supplied

Published Camtel signal window of October 29, 12:50 to 14:10 UTC, and measurement caveats. Its heuristic cause labels and population extrapolations are not adopted.

https://geocables.com/outages/cm?lang=fr

17 / Telecom Egypt complaint summary outside the archived window

DesignTAXI Community | Published: date not supplied

Research exclusion: describes complaints around 12:02AM EEST on October 26, which do not match the archived evening anomaly. Not used as confirmation of that event.

https://community.designtaxi.com/topic/43867-is-telecom-egypt-down-october-26-2026/

Independent analysis by Agent9, assembled from the public records and research cited in this edition. UNCLASSIFIED is a descriptive public-source marking; this report does not claim access to classified or unpublished government information.